> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# What Is STIR/SHAKEN? How Carriers Sign Caller ID

> STIR/SHAKEN lets carriers sign caller ID so receiving networks can check it. Learn A, B, C attestation, where signatures break, and what India does instead.

*November 3, 2026 · By [Piyush Sahoo](https://www.linkedin.com/in/piyush-s713/)*

STIR/SHAKEN is a caller ID authentication framework for IP phone networks. The originating carrier signs the calling number with a digital certificate and grades its confidence as A, B, or C. The receiving carrier verifies that signature. The result shows whether a number was vouched for, not whether the caller is honest.

This guide follows one signed call hop by hop, then shows where signatures get lost and how to read a failure. It also explains why an A rating can still front a scam, and how India's approach differs. Each outside fact links to the document it came from.

> [!NOTE]
>
> **Key takeaways**
>
> * STIR/SHAKEN **signs a claim about a number**. It doesn't block calls, and it doesn't judge intent.
> * **A, B, and C describe what the provider knows** about the customer and the number. They don't rate the call's quality.
> * **Signatures need an IP path.** A TDM hop, a stripped header, or a forwarded call can leave nothing valid to check.
> * **Coverage is partial.** One large US sample shows about [54.5% of calls arriving signed](https://transnexus.com/blog/2026/shaken-statistics-september/) in September 2026.
> * **India takes a different route.** It blocks spoofed international calls and now requires [caller name display on 4G and newer networks](https://theprint.in/india/no-more-unknown-callers-govt-makes-caller-name-display-mandatory-from-1-november/3072774/).

## Why does caller ID need signing at all?

On the phone network, the calling number is a statement made by whichever network starts the call. Later networks have historically had [no signature or certificate to test it against](https://www.cavalier.in/nda-current-affairs/2026-10-09/caller-id-authentication-itu-cross-border-telecom-fraud-2026). That was tolerable when few companies could originate calls.

IP telephony changed the economics. Once anyone can buy origination capacity, [the calling number can become just a setting](https://www.cavalier.in/nda-current-affairs/2026-10-09/caller-id-authentication-itu-cross-border-telecom-fraud-2026). STIR/SHAKEN gives the receiving side a way to check who vouched for it.

The name covers three separate layers:

| Layer | Who defines it | What it does |
| - | - | - |
| **STIR** | IETF | Defines the [`Identity` header for SIP](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8224.html), the signed [PASSporT token](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8225.html), and [certificates for telephone authority](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8226.html) |
| **SHAKEN** | ATIS and SIP Forum | Profiles STIR for carrier networks and adds the [`attest` and `origid` claims](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8588.html) |
| **Governance** | National bodies | In the US, a [Governance Authority, a Policy Administrator, and approved Certification Authorities](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-32A1.txt) control who can sign |

## How does a signed call travel from caller to phone?

![Ladder diagram. A certificate system of Governance Authority, Policy Administrator, and Certification Authority supplies the originating provider with a certificate. Your app sends an INVITE to the originating provider, which grades the call and signs a PASSporT. The INVITE with its Identity header passes through a transit provider to the terminating provider, which fetches the certificate and checks the signature, time, and numbers. The call and result then reach analytics, which ring, label, or block.](https://mintcdn.com/vobizai/O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z/images/blog/what-is-stir-shaken/sign-and-verify-ladder-light.svg?fit=max\&auto=format\&n=O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z\&q=85\&s=8d63038c5e0651ee6bd7f251ee0c7f0e)

1. **Before any call,** the provider [uses an SPC token to obtain a certificate](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-32A1.txt). Certificates expire, so the provider revalidates its authorization periodically.
2. **At call setup,** your system sends a SIP `INVITE` carrying the number you want to present.
3. **The originating provider signs.** It decides the attestation level, builds a PASSporT, and [places it in the `Identity` header](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-32A1.txt).
4. **Transit providers forward it.** The header is [expected to pass through unchanged](https://www.ecg.co/blog/134-what-you-need-to-know-about-stir-shaken-in-seven-key-facts), though some session border controllers drop headers they don't recognise.
5. **The terminating provider verifies.** It fetches the signer's certificate and compares the signed values with the actual `INVITE`.
6. **Policy takes over.** Verification produces a result, and what happens next is a separate decision. Verizon, for example, says it [doesn't block on this data alone](https://www.verizon.com/business/products/contact-center-cx-solutions/voice-security/stir-shaken-caller-id-identification/) and feeds it into call analytics.

Each signed value has a job. The table below uses the claim names from [RFC 8588's SHAKEN example](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8588.html), and [RFC 8224](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8224.html) explains how these checks limit cut-and-paste attacks.

| Token field | What it holds | Why it matters |
| - | - | - |
| `orig` | The calling number | Exposes a presented number that was swapped after signing |
| `dest` | The called number | Stops a captured token being replayed against someone else |
| `iat` | The signing time | Limits reuse of an old token. [RFC 8224 recommends a 60-second freshness window](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8224.html) |
| `attest` | A, B, or C | States how much the signer claims to know |
| `origid` | A UUID for the origination | [Helps correlate calls and tokens in logs](https://www.ecg.co/blog/134-what-you-need-to-know-about-stir-shaken-in-seven-key-facts) |
| `x5u` | The certificate location | Tells the verifier where to find the signer's public key |

## What do A, B, and C attestation mean?

An attestation is the provider's statement about its own knowledge. The FCC's May 2026 notice [summarises the ATIS criteria](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-32A1.txt), and you can read them as three questions.

![Decision map. If the provider has no relationship with whoever originated the call, it must use C, gateway. If it is not putting the call onto the IP network with a direct, identifiable customer, the standards also permit C. If it knows the customer but has not verified the link to the number, it uses B, partial. If all three hold, it can use A, full, which claims knowledge that the number is not spoofed.](https://mintcdn.com/vobizai/O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z/images/blog/what-is-stir-shaken/attestation-decision-light.svg?fit=max\&auto=format\&n=O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z\&q=85\&s=4183c4c5a5a3205fe0cb74cbfaf08001)

Your setup shapes the grade more than your traffic does:

| Your setup | Grade to expect | Why |
| - | - | - |
| Your app places calls through the provider that assigned the number | A is possible | The provider can satisfy all three criteria |
| Your PBX presents a number hosted at another carrier | B or C | The provider [knows you but may lack proof of the number](https://www.ecg.co/blog/134-what-you-need-to-know-about-stir-shaken-in-seven-key-facts) |
| The call reaches a US provider from a foreign network | C | A gateway provider [has no relationship with the originator](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-32A1.txt) |

Multi-carrier routing creates a trap here. ECG calls it an [attestation gap](https://www.ecg.co/blog/134-what-you-need-to-know-about-stir-shaken-in-seven-key-facts): the same number can show A on one route and B or C on another. If attestation matters to you, map your outbound routes before you add a second carrier.

Standards work also offers [certificate delegation](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9060.html), where a provider grants an enterprise its own signing credential. Ask your provider whether this applies before you plan around it.

## Does an A rating mean a call is safe?

No. A-level attestation says the provider claims to know the number isn't spoofed. It says nothing about what the caller wants.

![Two charts from TransNexus for September 2026. Robocall share: A-attested 1.6 percent, all calls 3.4 percent, B-attested 4.6 percent, C-attested 7.8 percent. Top 10 robocall signers attested 75 percent of their calls A, 5 percent B, and 20 percent C.](https://mintcdn.com/vobizai/O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z/images/blog/what-is-stir-shaken/robocalls-by-attestation-light.svg?fit=max\&auto=format\&n=O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z\&q=85\&s=15f03d6af4a81f5b0d6a3ee8bb61842d)

[TransNexus's September 2026 data](https://transnexus.com/blog/2026/shaken-statistics-september/) shows both sides. A-attested traffic had the lowest robocall share. Yet the ten most prolific robocall signers gave A to 75% of their calls. The data comes from hundreds of providers using TransNexus products, so read it as a sample.

The [FCC's own notice](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-32A1.txt) cites harder cases:

* **Lingo Telecom.** The FCC found it gave A-level attestation to 3,978 spoofed robocalls. Those calls used a deepfake voice of then-President Biden.
* **Spoofed brands.** The American Bankers Association analysed 12,900 calls that illegally spoofed numbers of 47 large companies. More than half received A or B.

So build on the signal with care. If your voice agent or IVR reads a verified result, treat it as one input to routing or fraud scoring. Don't let it unlock an account or approve a payment.

## Where do signatures get lost?

A valid signature needs an intact SIP path, a reachable certificate, and values that still match the call. Four common paths behave differently.

![Four call paths. All-IP: the header arrives and the signature can be checked. TDM hop: nothing to verify unless the token also travels out of band. Call from another country: a US gateway provider signs C, so the signature is valid but identifies only who handed over the call. Forwarded call: the signed destination no longer matches unless a diversion token is added.](https://mintcdn.com/vobizai/O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z/images/blog/what-is-stir-shaken/where-signatures-break-light.svg?fit=max\&auto=format\&n=O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z\&q=85\&s=786c8f1e0d99d38b16d06485644c3eb0)

* **TDM segments.** The FCC says the fingerprint is [washed off when any part of the path is non-IP](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-411101A1.txt). [RFC 8816](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8816.html) defines an out-of-band way to deliver PASSporTs around such hops.
* **Borders.** Overseas operators don't have to follow another country's verification rules. Ofcom named this gap when it [weighed gateway attestation for calls from overseas](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/phones-telecoms-and-internet/information-for-industry/scams/calling-line-identification-cli-authentication-assessment-and-future-roadmap?v=330857).
* **Forwarding.** The original token names the original destination. [RFC 8946](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8946.html) adds a diversion PASSporT that explains the change to verifiers.

When a carrier's policy rejects a call on these grounds, [RFC 8224 defines specific SIP responses](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8224.html). A network may label a call rather than reject it, so you can see a verification result and no error.

| Response | Meaning | Where to look first |
| - | - | - |
| `428 Use Identity Header` | The verifier's policy needs a signature, and none arrived | Was the call signed? Did an SBC or TDM hop remove the header? |
| `436 Bad Identity Info` | The verifier couldn't get the credential | Is the certificate URL reachable? |
| `437 Unsupported Credential` | It has the credential but doesn't support it, for example an untrusted CA | Is the certificate from an authority that network trusts? |
| `438 Invalid Identity Header` | No valid, supported PASSporT was received | Do the signed numbers match the `INVITE`? Did a transit network alter a signed header? |
| `403 Stale Date` | The signed time is older than the verifier's freshness policy allows | Is the signing clock correct? Did a retry reuse an old token? |

## Who requires STIR/SHAKEN today?

Rules differ by country, and they bind providers rather than the businesses that place calls. This table reflects what we could read on November 3, 2026.

| Country | Position | Source date |
| - | - | - |
| **United States** | [Providers must implement it in IP networks](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-32A1.txt) unless exempt. [Third-party signing rules took effect on September 18, 2025](https://transnexus.com/blog/2025/third-party-shaken-rules-date-reminder/) | May 2026, September 2025 |
| **Canada** | TransNexus reported that the CRTC made it [a condition of service for IP networks, with a November 30, 2021 deadline](https://transnexus.com/blog/2021/crtc-postpones-shaken-deadline/). [Arcep describes it as in place in Canada](https://www.arcep.fr/mes-demarches-et-services/acteurs-regules/operateurs-telecoms/fiches-pratiques/authentification-numeros-telephone-fixe-ou-mobile-que-faire-en-tant-que-operateur-telephonique.html). The CRTC site blocks automated access, so we didn't read the decision itself | April 2021, March 2026 |
| **France** | Arcep says the national mechanism, MAN, [uses STIR/SHAKEN, and the law tells operators to block calls with a missing or invalid signature](https://www.arcep.fr/mes-demarches-et-services/acteurs-regules/operateurs-telecoms/fiches-pratiques/authentification-numeros-telephone-fixe-ou-mobile-que-faire-en-tant-que-operateur-telephonique.html). French mobile numbers have their own regime, and operators are phasing out B and C calls in stages | March 2026 |
| **United Kingdom** | Ofcom [decided not to proceed at that time](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/phones-telecoms-and-internet/information-for-industry/scams/calling-line-identification-cli-authentication-assessment-and-future-roadmap?v=330857), citing overseas calls, cost, and complexity | February 2024 |
| **India** | We found no TRAI or DoT rule requiring it. See the next section | November 2026 |

The US rules are still moving, and these items are proposals:

* **Non-IP calls.** The FCC's [April 2025 notice](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-411101A1.txt) proposes authentication for non-IP networks, with two years to comply if adopted. We found no final order.
* **Attestation standards.** The [May 2026 further notice](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-421877A1.txt) proposes to raise the standards for assigning attestations and to close implementation loopholes. Its [full text](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-32A1.txt) proposes codifying the A, B, and C levels.
* **Robocall Mitigation Database.** The FCC [voted on further proposals on July 22, 2026](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-423290A1.txt) to tighten filing and keep bad actors out. We found no final order.

## How does India handle caller ID trust?

India has built its controls around different questions. STIR/SHAKEN asks who vouched for a number. India's tools ask whether a call from abroad is pretending to be local, whose name sits behind a number, and whether a commercial caller is using the right series.

| Control | Question it answers | Status |
| - | - | - |
| **International Incoming Spoofed Calls Prevention System** | Is a call from abroad showing an Indian number? | [Launched October 22, 2024](https://www.freepressjournal.in/amp/india/dot-reports-90-drop-in-fraud-international-calls-from-indian-numbers). DoT reported about 1.35 crore calls blocked in the first 24 hours |
| **Carrier action** | Which foreign carriers keep sending spoofed calls? | [More than 20 blocked by January 2025](https://telanganatoday.com/international-spoof-calls-centre-gets-cracking-the-whip-over-20-foreign-carriers-blocked), when spoofed calls were about 4 lakh a day |
| **"International Call" label** | Did this call come from outside India? | Part of the [DoT circular of October 13, 2026](https://theprint.in/india/no-more-unknown-callers-govt-makes-caller-name-display-mandatory-from-1-november/3072774/) |
| **CNAP name display** | Which name is on this connection's KYC record? | [Required from November 1, 2026](https://theprint.in/india/no-more-unknown-callers-govt-makes-caller-name-display-mandatory-from-1-november/3072774/) on 4G and newer. 2G, 3G, and landlines will be considered separately |
| **140 and 160 series** | Is this commercial call on the right number range? | See [Vobiz calling regulations](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/compliance/india/calling-regulations.md) and the [UCC guide](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/compliance/india/ucc.md) |

CNAP deserves care, because it's easy to confuse with STIR/SHAKEN. CNAP looks up a name [from the operator's KYC data](https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2025/11/01/trai-approves-verified-caller-id-cnap-scctimes-update/). [Reports of the circular](https://theprint.in/india/no-more-unknown-callers-govt-makes-caller-name-display-mandatory-from-1-november/3072774/) describe a database query between operators, not a signature that travels with the call. As one report notes, [a SIM registered to a relative or a fake ID shows that name](https://www.ibtimes.co.in/unknown-callers-display-names-november-1-government-makes-cnap-mandatory-907537).

If you run a business line, the same circular lets business and bulk connections [show a verified preferred name](https://theprint.in/india/no-more-unknown-callers-govt-makes-caller-name-display-mandatory-from-1-november/3072774/). The name must be a registered trademark or a GST trade name. Ask your operator how to apply.

Cross-border verification may come next. At an ITU roundtable in October 2026, Minister of State Chandra Sekhar Pemmasani [welcomed the ITU's proposal for joint trials and suggested starting on selected international routes](https://indiantelevision.com/iworld/india-backs-global-telecom-fraud-trials-as-losses-top-rs-22800-crore-pemmasani/). That's backing for a trial, not a mandate or an adopted standard, so don't design around it yet.

## Which checks apply to your calls?

Start with call direction, because that determines which system you depend on.

![Decision map by call direction. Outbound to the US: use a number your provider has tied to your account, keep those calls on that route, expect gateway treatment if crossing a border, and log attestation and spam flags. Outbound within India: complete KYC, use a number registered to you, use the 140 or 160 series for commercial calls, ask about a CNAP preferred name, and expect attestation fields to read Not Applicable. Inbound to your app: read the verification result, treat it as one input, never use caller ID alone to unlock an account or payment, and step up with an OTP or knowledge check.](https://mintcdn.com/vobizai/O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z/images/blog/what-is-stir-shaken/which-checks-apply-light.svg?fit=max\&auto=format\&n=O7qj4DettrLZsu3Z\&q=85\&s=99010df9f56b7f42f188c1e1ceea91e1)

Signing also isn't the same as display. [Rich Call Data](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9795.html) extends PASSporT with signed caller details such as a name. Our [caller ID and CNAM guide](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/blogs/what-is-caller-id-cnam.md) covers how names reach the screen today.

## How Vobiz reports STIR/SHAKEN on your calls

Vobiz exposes attestation data on calls, so you can log it alongside your other call data.

* **Live calls.** [Retrieve a live call](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/call/retrieve-live-call.md) to read `stir_attestation` and `stir_verification`. Either can return `Not Applicable`.
* **Call records.** The [Call object](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/call/call-object.md) documents `stir_verification`: `Verified` (attestation A), `Not Verified` (B or C), or `Not Applicable`, for example on non-US calls. On outbound calls it reflects the attestation Vobiz assigned, and on inbound calls the one received.
* **Webhooks (callbacks).** [Make Call](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/call/make-call.md) documents `STIRAttestation` and `STIRVerification` in its callback parameters. [Dial](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/xml/dial.md) events may also carry `STIRVerification` on applicable calls.
* **Caller ID.** The [`from` value](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/call/make-call) must be a number on your account, and VobizXML [`callerId` on Dial](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/xml/dial) should be an owned or authorized Vobiz number.
* **Rejections.** [Hangup cause `3130`](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/concepts/hangup-causes) marks a carrier spam block, and `3140` marks a caller ID on a Do Not Originate list.
* **Number health.** [Number health](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/account-phone-number/get-number-health.md) returns a spam flag and answer metrics for a Vobiz number over time.
* **India.** [Calling regulations](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/compliance/india/calling-regulations.md) cover KYC and caller ID rules, and [140 and 160 series acquisition](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/best-practices/140-160-acquisition.md) covers commercial numbers.
* **Your own carrier.** With [Bring Your Own Carrier](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/concepts/bring-your-own-carrier.md), your numbers stay with your existing provider, so raise signing questions with that provider too.

Test calls place real calls and are billed to your account. Run them with your own Auth ID and Auth Token, and confirm the numbers first.

## Frequently asked questions

> [accordion] What does STIR/SHAKEN stand for?
>
> STIR means Secure Telephone Identity Revisited, a set of IETF standards for signing call identity. SHAKEN means Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs, the ATIS and SIP Forum profile that tells carriers how to deploy STIR. People use the combined name for the whole framework.

> [accordion] Does STIR/SHAKEN stop robocalls?
>
> No, not by itself. It gives the receiving network a signed claim about the calling number, and that network then decides what to do. It makes spoofing a number harder and helps tracing. A robocaller using a number it legitimately holds can still pass verification.

> [accordion] What are A, B, and C attestation?
>
> They grade what the signing provider knows. A means it knows the customer and has verified that customer's link to the number. B means it knows the customer but not the link to the number. C means it has no such knowledge, as at an international gateway.

> [accordion] How do I get A-level attestation?
>
> You can't set it yourself, because your provider assigns the level. Use a number that provider has tied to your account, place the call through that provider, and keep your customer records current. Then check the attestation value it reports on your calls.

> [accordion] Is STIR/SHAKEN mandatory?
>
> In the US, FCC rules require voice providers to implement it in their IP networks unless an exemption applies. Canada also requires it, and France requires a mechanism built on it. The UK's Ofcom decided in February 2024 not to proceed at that time. The obligation falls on providers, not on the businesses making calls.

> [accordion] Is STIR/SHAKEN used in India?
>
> We found no TRAI or DoT rule requiring it as of November 3, 2026. India relies on blocking spoofed international calls, CNAP name display on 4G and newer networks, and registered commercial number series. India has also backed ITU trials of cross-border caller verification.

## Further reading on Vobiz

* [What is caller ID and CNAM?](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/blogs/what-is-caller-id-cnam.md) · [What is SIP trunking?](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/blogs/what-is-sip-trunking.md)
* [Call object](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/call/call-object.md) · [Hangup causes](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/concepts/hangup-causes.md)
* [India calling regulations](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/compliance/india/calling-regulations.md) · [Voice calls overview](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/call/overview.md)

## Sources

**Standards**

* IETF, [RFC 8224: Authenticated Identity Management in SIP](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8224.html), February 2018.
* IETF, [RFC 8225: PASSporT](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8225.html), February 2018.
* IETF, [RFC 8226: Secure Telephone Identity Credentials](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8226.html), February 2018.
* IETF, [RFC 8588: PASSporT Extension for SHAKEN](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8588.html), May 2019.
* IETF, [RFC 8816: STIR Out-of-Band Architecture and Use Cases](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8816.html), February 2021.
* IETF, [RFC 8946: PASSporT Extension for Diverted Calls](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8946.html), February 2021.
* IETF, [RFC 9060: STIR Certificate Delegation](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9060.html), September 2021.
* IETF, [RFC 9795: PASSporT Extension for Rich Call Data](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9795.html), July 2025.

**Regulators**

* FCC, [Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 26-32](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-32A1.txt), adopted May 20, 2026.
* FCC, [News release on Know-Your-Upstream-Provider and STIR/SHAKEN proposals](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-421877A1.txt), May 20, 2026.
* FCC, [News release on Robocall Mitigation Database proposals](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-423290A1.txt), July 22, 2026.
* FCC, [News release on the non-IP caller ID proposal](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-411101A1.txt), April 28, 2025.
* Ofcom, [CLI authentication: assessment and future roadmap](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/phones-telecoms-and-internet/information-for-industry/scams/calling-line-identification-cli-authentication-assessment-and-future-roadmap?v=330857), February 1, 2024.
* Arcep, [Authentification des numéros : que faire en tant qu'opérateur téléphonique](https://www.arcep.fr/mes-demarches-et-services/acteurs-regules/operateurs-telecoms/fiches-pratiques/authentification-numeros-telephone-fixe-ou-mobile-que-faire-en-tant-que-operateur-telephonique.html), in French, updated March 27, 2026.

**India reporting**

* ThePrint, [Govt makes caller name display mandatory from 1 November](https://theprint.in/india/no-more-unknown-callers-govt-makes-caller-name-display-mandatory-from-1-november/3072774/), October 2026.
* IBTimes India, [Unknown callers to display names from November 1](https://www.ibtimes.co.in/unknown-callers-display-names-november-1-government-makes-cnap-mandatory-907537), October 2026.
* SCC Online, [TRAI approves CNAP rollout](https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2025/11/01/trai-approves-verified-caller-id-cnap-scctimes-update/), November 2025.
* Free Press Journal, [DoT reports 90% drop in fraud international calls](https://www.freepressjournal.in/amp/india/dot-reports-90-drop-in-fraud-international-calls-from-indian-numbers), December 2024.
* Telangana Today, [Over 20 foreign carriers blocked](https://telanganatoday.com/international-spoof-calls-centre-gets-cracking-the-whip-over-20-foreign-carriers-blocked), January 2025.
* Indian Television, [India backs global telecom fraud trials](https://indiantelevision.com/iworld/india-backs-global-telecom-fraud-trials-as-losses-top-rs-22800-crore-pemmasani/), October 2026.
* The Cavalier, [The number on your screen was never verified](https://www.cavalier.in/nda-current-affairs/2026-10-09/caller-id-authentication-itu-cross-border-telecom-fraud-2026), October 2026.

**Industry**

* TransNexus, [STIR/SHAKEN statistics from September 2026](https://transnexus.com/blog/2026/shaken-statistics-september/), October 2026.
* TransNexus, [Third-party SHAKEN rules deadline almost here](https://transnexus.com/blog/2025/third-party-shaken-rules-date-reminder/), September 2025.
* TransNexus, [Canadian regulator postpones STIR/SHAKEN deadline](https://transnexus.com/blog/2021/crtc-postpones-shaken-deadline/), April 2021.
* ECG, [What is STIR/SHAKEN and why it's important](https://www.ecg.co/blog/134-what-you-need-to-know-about-stir-shaken-in-seven-key-facts).
* Verizon, [STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication](https://www.verizon.com/business/products/contact-center-cx-solutions/voice-security/stir-shaken-caller-id-identification/).

> [card] [Build calls on Vobiz](https://www.vobiz.ai/docs/quick-start.md)
>
> Set up a phone number and place your first call.


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